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ABSTRACT Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are increasingly used for authentication and identifica-
tion applications as well as the cryptographic key generation. An important feature of a PUF is the reliance
on minute random variations in the fabricated hardware to derive a trusted random key. Currently, most PUF
designs focus on exploiting process variations intrinsic to the CMOS technology. In recent years, progress
in emerging nanoelectronic devices has demonstrated an increase in variation as a consequence of scaling
down to the nanoregion. To date, emerging PUFs with nanotechnology have not been fully established, but
they are expected to emerge. Initial research in this area aims to provide security primitives for emerging
integrated circuits with nanotechnology. In this paper, we review emerging nanotechnology-based PUFs.
INDEX TERMS Physical unclonable functions, hardware security, nanoelectronic devices, nanotechnology,
reconfigurable PUF, strong PUF.
I. INTRODUCTION
The earliest known lock, resembling the mechanical locks of
this century, dates back to 4,000 years ago—a large Egyptian
wooden lock found in the ruins of the Assyrian palace of
Khorsabad near Niveveh [1]. Modern security systems still
keep valuables under lock and key in order to ensure the
safety and authenticity of goods, information or identities.
Locks now, however, can refer to electronic security systems
with digital keys that are coded in, for example, magnetic
strips or silicon chips. Digital keys are traditionally stored in
non-volatile memory (NVM) for cryptographic applications.
However, it has been shown that digital keys in NVMs are
vulnerable to invasive physical attacks. Complicated tam-
per sensing and tamper-proofing mechanisms have to be
implemented in hardware to secure digital keys in NVM [2]
with consequential increases in area and power overhead
of the device—which also limits the use of these anti-
tampering methods for resource-constrained devices such as
smart cards.
The growing new area of PUFs—previously termed
Physical One-Way Functions [3], [4], or Physical Random
Functions [5]—is receiving increased attention because PUFs
offer a simple alternative to generating unique volatile digital
keys in a very small hardware device without the need for
tamper-sensingmechanisms. Note that PUFs are easy to build
but practically impossible to duplicate, because they rely on
uncontrollable physical parameter variations that occur dur-
ing hardware device manufacture. More importantly, secrecy
of a PUF is derived from inherent complexity in a given
physical system only when it is needed, and thus PUFs can
thwart physical attacks [2].
In general, when a challenge (input) is presented to
a PUF, a corresponding response (output) will be gener-
ated. This response is determined by a complex physical
function that is unique to each device or PUF instance
as shown in Fig. 1. Given the same challenge, different
PUF instantiations built upon the same design will deliver
a different response. The challenge and its corresponding
response are commonly referred to as a Challenge Response
Pair (CRP). A set of CRPs can be treated as a finger-
print of a PUF and therefore a PUF integrated device or
object.
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FIGURE 1. A PUF can be simply treated as a black box. The response is
determined by the complex physical function of a PUF that is unique to
each device and the challenge applied to it.
Conventional microelectronic circuit based PUFs such
as ring oscillator PUFs [6], arbiter PUFs [7], and SRAM
PUFs [8] exploit uncontrollable process variations in conven-
tional Complementary-Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS)
fabrication technology. In fact, a silicon-based identification
circuit first proposed in year 2000 can also be classified as a
PUF since it also exploits the randomness within a hardware
device to generate a secret key [9]. Note that PUFs based
on conventional CMOS technology are well established and
related industrial products are already on the market. How-
ever, technological developments are particularly important
for building PUFs as they rely on process variations. There-
fore, it is expected that the next generation of PUFs will be
implemented using emerging nanoelectronic devices [10].
Nanotechnologies, such as the phase change
memory (PCM) [11], spin-transfer torque magnetic random-
access memory (STT-MRAM) [12], carbon-nanotube field-
effect transistors (CNFETs) [13] and memristors1 [14], have
more severe levels of inherent randomness due to fabrication
process variations (e.g. thickness, cross-sectional area or
doping profile) as a consequence of scaling down to the nano
region. This inherent randomness provides new opportunities
for building highly secure and reliable PUFs. Moreover, these
nanodevices are relatively simple to fabricate and are usually
1In the literature, the terms memristor and memristive device are used
interchangeably, and sometimes the term RRAM is used. There are different
classifications of memristors, but this is out of the scope of this paper and we
concentrate on security applications of the device, in particular, PUF designs.
In this paper, the term memristor refers to a bipolar memristor.
compatible with CMOS fabrication processes. Together with
simple nanoscale crossbar architectures that allow for ultra
high-density information offer a potentially low-cost security
primitive. Furthermore, special properties of these emerg-
ing nanoelectronic devices, such as cycle-to-cycle (C2C)
variations during programming, offer further opportunities
to construct novel PUF structures, e.g. reconfigurable PUF
(see definition in Section II-C).
Already, there are a number of recent studies investigating
emerging nanoelectronic devices for building PUF architec-
tures and, consequently, they offer new solutions for PUF
based security applications and opportunities for research and
development in the emerging field of nanotechnology based
PUFs [15]–[34]. This paper aims to give a timely review of
emerging nanodevice based PUFs. In addition, we summarize
the challenges and opportunities in this emerging research
area, as a potential guide for hardware security designers
and device engineers. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 presents a primer on conventional PUFs.
This is followed by a survey of recent nanotechnology-based
PUFs in Section 3. Then a discussion of emerging PUFs
architectures is given in Section 4, followed by a conclusion
in Section 5.
II. A PUF PRIMER
A. CONVENTIONAL PUFS
Pappu et al. introduced an optical PUF in 2001 [3], [4],
also called a physical one-way function, where the response
(speckle pattern) is dependent on the input laser loca-
tion/polarization (i.e. challenge). The Optical PUF, however,
requires relatively large and high-cost external measurement
devices. Moreover, its reliability is highly dependent on very
accurate calibration of the input location. Furthermore, it
is difficult to integrate an Optical PUF into a resource-
constrained hardware device such a contactless smart
card.
Gassend et al. [5] then proposed a practical implementation
of a microelectronic circuit based PUF—this was initially
called a Physical Random Function, and later termed the
Arbiter PUF (APUF). The APUF exploits manufacturing
variability in gate and wire delays as the source of unclonable
randomness. The response is generated based on the time
delay difference between two signal propagation paths, con-
sisting of serially connected individual stages, where the path
through each stage is determined by a corresponding bit in a
challenge (i.e input bit vector). This structure is simple and
capable of generating an exponential number of CRPs.
However, an APUF is based on linear additive blocks
and is demonstrated to be vulnerable to model building
attacks [7], [35], [36] if an adversary is able to gain access to
CRPs either by eavesdropping or through directly measuring
the PUF to collect CRPs. To increase the complexity of
such model building attacks, more variants of APUFs were
proposed such as the XOR-APUF [6], [35] and the feed
forward APUF [35], [37]. Another issue that results from the
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APUF architecture is the inconsistent responses to repeated
application of certain challenges due to the arbitrator—
commonly implemented using a latch to determine the win-
ning signal path—entering into a metastable state, leading
to poor reliability. Furthermore, it is difficult to implement
APUFs on an FPGA based platform owing to strict symmet-
rical routing requirements on the two delay paths. To cir-
cumvent metastability issues, another time delay based PUF,
Ring Oscillator PUF (ROPUF), is proposed in [5] and [6]
and further improved in [38]–[40]. An overview of different
ROPUFs can be found in [41].
Besides the aforementioned delay-based PUFs, there
are mismatch based silicon PUFs such as the SRAM
PUF [8], [42], latch PUF [43], flip-flop PUF [44], [45],
butterfly PUF [46], and analog PUFs based on silicon such
as the current-based PUF [47] and nonlinear current mir-
ror based PUF [48], which exploit nonlinear characteristics
of current or voltage. Comprehensive reviews of conven-
tional PUF architectures can be found in [49] and [50].
Below we provide an overview of various classifications
of PUFs.
B. WEAK AND STRONG PUFS
In general, depending on the number of CRPs (or chal-
lenge space) that a PUF is capable of producing, PUFs can
be classified into two general categories: weak and strong
PUFs [50], [51].
Weak PUFs generate a limited number of CRPs, so CRPs
can be fully read out within a very short time once an adver-
sary has full physical access to it. Aweak PUF can be defined,
as follows:
• Impossible to be duplicated (cloned) physically.
• Number of CRPs is limited and linearly or polynomially
dependent on the number of challenge bits.
Typical weak PUFs are the SRAM PUF, butterfly PUF and
coating PUF [52].
Strong PUFs have been defined in [50] and [51] based on
an adversarial model where the adversary has access to the
PUF and can apply an unlimited amount of chosen challenges
to the PUF and is able to observe the raw responses of the
PUF (ie. before any post processing). A strong PUF needs to
prove its security under such a strong attack model. So we
can define a strong PUF according to the following security
properties:
• Impossible to be duplicated (cloned) physically.
• Supports a very large number of CRPs such that an
adversary cannot mount a brute force attack within a
realistic time, ideally demonstrated by exponential num-
ber of CRPs.
• Resilient to model building attacks by providing a poly-
nomial number of chosen CRPs such that an adversary
cannot predict the response of a PUF to a randomly
selected unused challenge.
Typical strong PUF candidates include Optical-PUFs and
XOR-APUF (e.g. 8 output XORs with 512 bit chal-
lenges) [50].
C. RECONFIGURABLE PUFS
The concept of a reconfigurable PUF (rPUF) was first artic-
ulated in [35]. In an rPUF, the PUF itself has the ability
to change its response to the same challenge. Instead of
exhibiting static challenge-response behavior, the ability to
update challenge-response behavior of a reconfigurable PUF
is desirable for a number of practical applications such as
the revocation or update of ‘secrets’ in PUF-based key gen-
eration and cryptographic primitives based on PUFs [53].
Since the definition expressed in [35], a stronger definition
of a reconfigurable PUF has been proposed to ensure that
the reconfiguration is difficult to reverse, even by an invasive
attack measure [17]. Therefore the reconfiguration is not
permitted to depend on a hidden device or parameter that can
be influenced by an attacker.
Ideally, a reconfigurable PUF (rPUF) can be updated in
such a way to alter the PUF into a new instance such that:
• The CRPs of an rPUF are unpredictable after reconfigu-
ration even if the CRPs of an rPUF before reconfigura-
tion are known.
• The security properties of the rPUF are preserved after
reconfiguration.
• Reconfiguration is uncontrollable such that it does not
rely on updating hidden devices or parameters.
D. PUBLIC PUF
The definition of a Public PUF (PPUF) is a multiple-input-
multiple-output system that is much faster to execute on the
physical device than it is to simulate by several orders of
magnitude [54]. In particular, the secrets of PUF and PPUF
are different. Secrets of a PUF rely on the unpredictability
of its responses for a given challenge based on complex
interactions with a physical function. The model of the PUF
that mathematically impersonates the physical function of
the PUF must be kept safe. In essence, a PUF can still be
considered as a ‘‘storage’’ device to store secret bits using
minuscule variations in the hardware device. In contrast, the
PPUF hardware contains no secrets, since the PPUF model is
known to every party including the verifier, prover and also
the adversary. As long as the model storage is secure against
tampering or rewriting, the authentication capability is solely
derived from the computational time difference between the
hardware based PPUF and its model, and the unclonability
of the physical PPUF, while the authentication protocol is
publicly known.
E. PERFORMANCE METRICS
There are several metrics to evaluate PUF perform-
ance [55], [56]. Randomness (without bias), uniqueness
and bit error rate (BER)—the complementary metric of
reliability—are the three most used metrics among them.
Randomness tests for bias by evaluating the probability of
a ‘1’ or ‘0’ bit in the response bits from one PUF instance. For
the ideal case of no bias towards a ‘1’ or ‘0’ bit, there is a 50%
probability for obtaining a ‘1’ or ‘0’.
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TABLE 1. Review and survey papers of different PUF related research areas.
Uniqueness represents the capability of one PUF instance
to distinguish itself from other PUF instances. It is measured
by the inter-Hamming Distance (inter-HD) defined as the
mean value of HD among different responses from different
PUF instances when the same challenge is applied to all
of these different PUFs. Ideally, uniqueness is expected to
be 50%, which means that responses from two different PUF
instances given the same challenge will have an average of
half the bits different.
Bit Error Rate is measured by intra-HD defined as the
mean value of flipped bits among different responses when
the same challenge is applied to the same PUF instance, under
different ambient environments, eg. temperature, power sup-
ply fluctuations. Although it is not possible to obtain an
ideal value of 0%, the BER should be as small as possible
to facilitate the hardware design for error correction. Some
literature on PUF designs focus on stabilizing the response
with a wide range tolerance on temperature and aging influ-
ence [57], [58].
F. APPLICATIONS
Weak PUFs are commonly used for cryptographic key gener-
ation. In such an application, error correction must be carried
out with the use of helper data [6], [59], [60] considering that
the raw responses of a PUF are impacted by ambient environ-
mental parameters such as temperature, supply voltage, and
aging. Interested readers can read [61] to obtain further details
on helper data algorithms for PUF-based key generation.
In addition, weak PUFs are used to bind software to hardware
devices in order to secure booting [62] and remote computing
platforms [63], [64].
Strong PUFs can also be used to generate cryptographic
keys but they are preferred for use in lightweight authentica-
tion applications since a large number of CRPs is available,
ensuring many rounds of authentication. This lightweight
authentication protocol works as follows:
• Before the PUF is transfered to a prover, a CRP database
of this PUF is established on the side of the verifier
through measurements.
• Whenever a prover requests an authentication, the ver-
ifier sends a randomly selected challenge from the
database to the prover and receives a response obtained
by the prover who applies the challenge to the physical
PUF in hand.
• The authentication is considered successful only if the
response from the prover is similar/close to the response
stored in the database.
In this authentication protocol, a CRP is never used more than
once to avoid reply-attacks.
This simple authentication protocol protects against
device substitution and counterfeits without using cryp-
tographic operations and, thus, makes strong PUFs suit-
able for resource-constrained devices such as RFID
devices [65]–[67]. However, it has been demonstrated that
this protocol is susceptible to model building attacks [51].
To overcome such an attack and other possible attacks,
enhanced authentication protocols have been propo-
sed [68]–[71]. We refer readers to [72] for further details on
different lightweight authentication protocols in the literature
until 2014. Besides authentication applications, strong PUFs
can be used for more complex cryptographic applications
such as oblivious transfer (OT), bit commitment (BC), and
key exchange (KE) [18], [36], [69], [73], [74].
rPUF can be used to update security tokens [53], such
as electronic tickets, secure storage in untrusted memo-
ries [17], [75] or to prevent downgrading software versions
by binding hardware to software [76].
PPUF can be used in advanced applications such as
public-key cryptography, secure location authentication,
k-anonymity security protocol, and trusted sensing and
computing [50].
G. LIST OF REVIEW/SURVEY PAPERS
A summary of reviews and surveys are given in Table 1. Note
that in the last two papers, [77] and [78], in Table 1 survey
different hardware security primitives based on emerging
nanoelectronic devices. The PUF is only one of a number of
security primitives surveyed in these two papers. In terms of
PUFs based on emerging nanoelectronic devices, the work
in [77] surveys four PUF structures based on memristors.
In contrast, the scope of our article on PUFs is much
broader in its coverage of nanotechnology based PUFs.
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FIGURE 2. Emerging PUFs with nanotechnology. A general classification according to the technology employed.
Note that several PUF designs do not rely on a specific technology (medium) and these are clearly indicated in
our article.
In [78], Rajendran et al. choose the memristor as the can-
didate device for enabling security primitives based on nan-
odevices. In terms of a PUF based security primitive, the
work in [78] focuses on a nano PPUF. We limit our survey
to nanodevice based PUFs. Therefore, we give a broader and
more detailed survey of those PUF structures—specifically,
those based on PCM, STT-MRAM, memristor, Carbon-
Nanotube Field-Effect Transistors (CNFET) and nano
diode.
III. EMERGING NANOELECTRONICS BASED PUFS
Initial investigations of nanoelectronic-based PUFs are moti-
vated by the desire to achieve more secure, robust and
lightweight PUF designs whilst further combining a number
of unique properties, such C2C (cycle-to-cycle) program-
ming variations and multi-response capability per memory
cell, of nanodevices to achieve desirable PUF characteristics
such as reconfigurability and capability of multiple response
per memory cell.
Specifically, we review novel PUF designs based on
PCM, STT-MRAM andmemristor nanodevices that also hold
promise for future universal memory. These technologies
provide opportunities for the design of novel PUF struc-
tures because of substantial process variations, small foot-
print, lower energy consumption, non-volatility, multi-level
bits (MLB) capability per memory cell, programming sen-
sitivity, and C2C programming variations. We also sur-
vey a PUF based on a nano diode where the readout
speed is intentionally slowed down through the construction
of a nanocrossbar to prevent the attacker reading all the
information within the high information density nanocross-
bar. Moreover, a PUF design based on a MOSFET
(Metal–Oxide–Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor) like
device, CNFET, is also surveyed.
As we will see in the following subsections, each PUF
structure is built on one or more aforementioned nanodevice
properties to meet requirements of different application sce-
narios. A general classification is shown in Fig. 2. Note that
several PUF designs, although demonstrated using a specific
nanodevice, may be implemented using a different type of
nanodevice; this will be pointed out when these designs are
surveyed.
A. SUPER-HIGH INFORMATION CONTENT PUF (SHIC-PUF)
A special nanocrossbar array of nanoscale diodes as a large
memory lattice capable of storing a significant number of ran-
dom bits, called a SHIC-PUF, was proposed in [16], [80]—
see Fig. 9 for a brief description of a nanocrossbar. The
SHIC-PUF cannot be modeled since values stored in the
memory lattice are directly read out as independent responses
and therefore cloning requires constructing a copy of itsmem-
ory contents. A full readout of all the CRPsmay require a long
period, eg. around several months, due to the slow readout
speed (100 bit/s) and the very large amount of information
stored in the nanocrossbar. The application of SHIC-PUFs,
however, is limited to situations where there is no restriction
on readout speed and area requirements. Slowing the readout
speed intentionally also increases the enrollment time when
the verifier measures CRPs to create a secure database of
CRPs for later authentication operations.
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B. CARBON-NANOTUBE FIELD-EFFECT
TRANSISTORS (CNFET) BASED PUF
The CNFET is one of a promising new class of MOSFET-like
transistors that avoids most of the fundamental limitations for
traditional silicon MOSFETs [13]. The CNFET consists of
carbon nanotubes (CNTs), which is a molecular electronic
device attracting much attention as it can lead to further tech-
nology scaling [15], instead of bulk silicon. However, precise
control of CNTs in a fabrication process is challenging. As a
consequence, the CNFET performance shows large variations
due to:
• chirality, which defines the type—metallic or
semiconducting;
• diameter;
• growth density;
• alignment;
• doping concentration.
Particularly, the lack of chirality (and thus type) control is a
major issue for CNT usage in digital circuits as this results in
a large resistance change. In [15], Konigsmark et al. proposed
a CNFET based PUF—CNPUF—turning the disadvantage of
such variations into an advantage.
FIGURE 3. CNFET based PUF design (CNPUF).
The CNPUF is shown in Fig. 3. It is, in essence, similar
to an APUF. The CNPUF Parallel Elements (CNPUF-PEs),
comprising two CNFETs that share the same gate voltage,
are connected in series to build a chain. At the end of the
chain, the current comparator is utilized to compare the top
and bottom current to generate a 1-bit response.
The CNPUF-PE has two distinct and nearly independent
states for a high gate voltage and a low gate voltage, respec-
tively, due to the difference of a metallic-to-semiconducting
ratio in the CNFET. The current characteristics for a low
gate voltage are dominated by the metallic CNTs, while for
a high gate voltage, the semiconducting CNTs dominate the
current characteristics. The CNPUF-PE, in principle, acts
as the multiplexer in an APUF. The difference between a
CNPUF and APUF is that the generation of the response is
based on comparison of summation of resistance between the
top and bottom paths rather than the comparison of summa-
tion of time delays. In this paper, the authors demonstrate
the high reliability performance of the CNPUF, up to 97%,
without any post-processing. It appears that the simulation of
the the current comparator was not taken into consideration,
whichmay have led to a higher reliability performance during
simulation.
The CNPUF design compares the summation of resis-
tances while the APUF compares the summation of time
delays. Therefore, like the APUF, the CNPUF model is built
upon linear additive blocks. Consequently, we can expect
the CNPUF to be broken by attacks, such as model building
attacks, used for successfully breaking APUFs. However, the
possible vulnerability of CNPUFs to known model building
attacks is necessary for investigation.
The authors also proposed a security enhanced CNPUF—
extended CNPUF (ex-CNPUF)—which XORs the challenge
with the response from the other CNPUF. This design is
similar to XORed-APUF. It is clear that the reliability is
affected, which is also pointed out by the authors. In addition,
the ex-CNPUF leads to a higher power and area overhead.
FIGURE 4. (a) A cross-sectional view of a conventional PCM cell. (b) The
programming pulse passing through the PCM will change the temperature
in the active region using the heater based on the pulse amplitude and
duration. The resistance is read out by passing a small amplitude and
short duration pulse without disturbing the resistance of the PCM.
C. PCM BASED PUFS
Phase change memory (PCM) utilizes crystalline and amor-
phous nature of a phase change material. Crystalline and
amorphous phases have a larger resistivity difference cor-
responding to low resistivity (set state) and high resistivity
(reset state), respectively. A cross-sectional view of a con-
ventional PCM cell is shown in Fig. 4. To reset the PCM cell
into the amorphous phase, a high amplitude pulse with fast
fall time is applied to the heater to, firstly, melt the active
region and, subsequently, to quench it rapidly. Therefore, a
region of amorphous, highly resistive material is left in the
PCM cell. Conversely, a moderate amplitude pulse with a
long period or long fall time is used to set the PCM cell into
the crystalline phase, which anneals the active region, at a
temperature between the crystallization temperature and the
melting temperature for a time period sufficient for crystal-
lization. The read operation is carried out by measuring the
resistance of the PCM cell by passing a small current without
disturbing its resistance [11]. In addition, the resistance of the
PCM can be tuned to intermediate values between its high
resistance and low resistance by applying a programming
pulse with an intermediate amplitude and rise/fall time.
We review four PCM-based PUF structures that exploit
abundant process variation, small footprint, and lower energy
consumption of PCM technology together with programming
sensitivity feature to formulate the basis for PCM-based
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FIGURE 5. Accurate control over resistance for 2 logical states and an
accurate measurement gives one rPUF 2-bit response. After [17].
rPUFs. Hence, all of the four PUFs discussed below are
reconfigurable.
PCM-Based PUF 1: Kursawe et al. [17] firstly proposed a
concept that uses PCM to build up a rPUF. In this concept, as
illustrated in Fig. 5, the PCM state is expected to be controlled
well enough to reliably realize n logical states (resistance
axis divided into n intervals), while measurements are precise
enough to not only determine in which interval the resistance
lies, but also where in that interval to obtain a multiple bit
response. Each logical interval is subdivided into a number
of more fine-grained intervals, eg. ‘left’ and ‘right’, as seen
in Fig. 5. Since the programming process cannot be controlled
very well in practice, a long-lived random state that can be
reconfigured electronically can be derived from a PCM cell.
This observation is used to create a reconfigurable PUF from
embedded memory.
PCM-Based PUF 2: Zhang et al. [18] following the con-
cept in [17], proposed using a PCM based PUF to generate
refreshable cryptographic keys (PCKGen), where the keys
can be refreshed exploiting the reconfigurability of the CRPs
of a PCM-based PUF through re-programming. Therefore,
the kernel of the PCKGen is a PCM-based rPUF. In this
work, unlike the concept in [17], a circuit solution is pro-
vided. A block diagram of the PCKGen is shown in Fig. 6,
while the detailed circuit design can be found in [18]. The
PCM-based rPUF is enabled by reprogramming PCM cells
in an array. The response is based on the resistance compar-
ison of two selected PCMs—addresses of these two selected
FIGURE 6. Block diagram of PCKGen. The imprecisely controlled
current-pulse regulator (ICCR) is responsible for generating imprecise
duration and amplitude of the programming pulse to reconfigure the
PCM array. Comparator compares resistance of two selected PCM cells
(marked with red color)—where the address is determined by a
challenge—in the PCM array to generate raw responses.
PCM cells is the challenge. The reconfigurability is ensured
by the amplitude and width variations of the programming
pulse that refresh the resistance of all the PCMs in the array to
different values. The variations of programming pulse width
and amplitude depend on the intrinsic process variations of an
auxiliary CMOS circuit—the imprecisely controlled current-
pulse regulator (ICCR) block shown in Fig.6.
It is clear the response of this PCM-based rPUF is not
reliable enough to satisfy cryptographic key generation, so
further error correction assisted by helper data is required.
Hashing of responses is also used to further improve the
randomness of the responses. The power consumption of
PCKGen—as a memory based PUF—is higher than typical
memory based PUFs such as the butterfly PUF [46] and
the SRAM PUF [42] mainly owing to the reprogramming
operation and auxiliary circuits. But it has footprint advantage
due to the high density of PCM arrays. The other bene-
fit of PCM-based rPUF is that the key can be refreshed.
Zhang et al. [75], following their previous work [18], carried
out experimental evaluations of PCM based rPUF, on 180-nm
PCM chips.
PCM-Based PUF 3: Further, Zhang et al. [19] proposed
Memory-based Physical Unclonable Function (MemPUF)
based on their previous work—PCM-based PUF 2—to
overcome the susceptibility of secret keys to physical
attacks [18], [75]. In this case, we may assume that an
adversary has physical access to the MemPUF and is allowed
to measure all CRPs given enough time, where a challenge
is actually the address of one MemPUF cell. Hence, an
adversary could impersonate the original MemPUF by the
measured CRPs. To make these physical attacks ineffective,
Zhang et al. proposed using periodic self updates of the
PCM-based rPUF and subsequent enrollment to the verifier to
update the CRP database of the verifier. As a result, the CRPs
measured by an adversary for one updated rPUF instance
cannot be used to predict the response to the same challenge
after the rPUF is updated. This relies on the fact that the
reconfigurability is irreversible, therefore, the responses to
the same challenge generated at each update iteration are
independent. This study carries out statistical analysis to
demonstrate the effectiveness of their rPUF based on PCM
against the measurement-prediction attack given an adver-
sary with certain bounded attack capability. However, further
research is needed to develop the means to secure the com-
munication between the verifier and the prover to refresh the
CRP database after each update.
D. STT-MRAM-BASED PUFS
The STT-MRAM is made up of a CMOS transistor and a
magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) as shown in Fig. 7 [12].
By passing a current through the fixed layer, one can pro-
duce a spin-polarized current. If this spin-polarized cur-
rent is directed into the free layer, angular momentum can
be transferred to this layer, changing the orientation of its
magnet. When both of these two layers are under parallel
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FIGURE 7. (a) The STT-MRAM memory cell. (b) MTJ configuration.
configuration (P), the MTJ has low resistance. Conversely,
the MTJ shows high resistance under anti-parallel configura-
tion (AP).
The following five STT-MRAM-based PUFs in this sub-
section exploit prevalent process variations, non-volatility,
and MLB capability of STT-MRAM.
STT-MRAM-Based PUF 1: Marukame et al. proposed
a PUF based on magnetic tunnel junctions (MTJs) and a
method of extracting the PUF signature based on intrinsic
properties of spin transfer switching (STS) [20]. They experi-
mentally measured and characterized the STS characteristics,
followed by a method to extract a PUF signature. They found
that each measured MTJ exhibited different programming
voltages for the AP to P state and for P to AP state transitions.
The variability of the programming voltage between different
MTJs results from the extrinsic properties such as junction
resistance, and process damage.
FIGURE 8. Operation sequence for extracting a PUF signature from a 4×4
STT-MRAM array. The extracted data is categorized into three patterns:
much less than 50% (white), around 50% (gray) and much more than
50% (black). After [20].
Based on these variations, an operation sequence for
extracting a PUF signature from a 4×4 array of MTJs was
proposed as shown in Fig. 8. Firstly, a reset voltage is applied
to reset all of the MTJs in the array to initial state P. Then
a specific VPUF voltage—a pre-calibrated voltage–is applied
to the MTJs to induce switching with a 50% probability for
the majority of the MTJs. The stochastic switching results in
a random distribution of the P or AP state transitions across
the array. The information—resistance—of everyMTJ is read
out and evaluated by the PUF signature extraction circuit.
As a result, the MTJ cell is categorized into three patterns:
i) much less than 50%—resistance close to P state—(white);
ii) around 50%—in the middle of P and AP state (gray); and
iii) much more than 50%—resistance close to AP state—
(black). After the information is stored, the array is reset.
To increase the reliability of the extraction, the above oper-
ation sequence is repeated multiple times to extract white
and black bits and discard gray bits. The whole extraction
operation is similar to majority voting to determine reliable
bits. In the last step, the black bits will be chosen for the PUF
signature.
Although this work investigates the possibility of building
up a PUF based on STT-MRAM, further investigations are
needed to: i) design the extractor; ii) propose an efficient
approach to store the pattern information during each extrac-
tion process; iii) evaluate the relationship between PUF per-
formance and period and amplitude of VPUF , and the number
of repeated extractions used to generate a signature.
STT-MRAM-Based PUF 2: Vatajelu et al. exploited vari-
ations in AP state to extract a PUF response by comparing
current sensed from a selected MTJ in a STT-MRAM cell
with a reference current value that is generated by averaging
AP state resistance (high resistance) among a specific num-
ber of STT-MRAM cells. The STT-MRAM cells generating
responses are named as active cells, conversely, STT-MRAM
cells in charge of producing a reference current are named
as reference cells. If the sensing value is higher than the
reference current value, then logic ‘1’ is given as a response
corresponding to a challenge that is the address of this cell,
otherwise, logic ‘0’ is given. In contrast with the PUF design
of Marukame et al, Vatajelu et al. provided the extraction
circuit design and carried out performance evaluations on
randomness, uniqueness and reliability [21].
STT-MRAM-Based PUF 3: Zhang et al. proposed their
STT-PUF as a low-cost cryptographic key generator for
embedded computing platforms [22]. A response is generated
based on the resistance comparisons between two MTJs in
one selected 2T2MTJ (2-transistor-2-MTJ) cell, where both
of these two MTJs are initially reset/set to AP/P state simul-
taneously. The first extraction of the response bit is carried
out through comparing the resistance of these two MTJ cells.
After that, an Automatic Write-Back (AWB) scheme [81]
exploiting the non-volatility of STT-MRAM is employed to
write the logic value from the first extraction. The persis-
tent storage of the first extracted logic value demonstrates
enhanced reliability. In particular, the two MTJs in this cell
are automatically written back to the complementary states—
oneMTJ is set to P state and the other is set to the opposite AP
state—according to the value of the first extracted response
bit, that is logic ‘1’ or ‘0’.
Clearly, the regeneration of a response after AWB scheme
is robust because the response bit is now stored as the
complementary MTJ states of one 2T2MTJ cell. The BER
(Bit Error Rate) of STT-PUF is lower than 10−6—the indus-
trial standard of BER for a cryptographic key—and con-
sequently reduces the chip area needed for STT-MRAM
PUF based key generators by eliminating the need for
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ECCs (Error Correction Code) schemes in hardware. This
work is based on simulations conducted using a 40 nm com-
pact MTJ device model [82].
STT-MRAM-Based PUF 4: The other study from
Zhang et al. [23] investigated Buffer-Free Memory-based
PUF (BF-MPUF). Specifically, this design exploits the non-
volatility of emerging Non-Volatile Memory (eNVM). The
BF-MPUF is able to generate PUF responses without disturb-
ing the data stored in the memory. In conventional memory
based PUFs such as SRAMPUF, the data preserved as charge
will be overwritten if the same memory is used for extracting
a PUF response. As a consequence, a buffer storage and a
write back circuit are needed to store the current data that
will be written back to the memory cell after generating the
response. The BF-MPUF removes the need for such buffer
storage and additional write back operation circuit by relying
on the non-volatility of eNVM, and hence provide a lower
power and area overhead compared with SRAM PUFs.
In BF-MPUF, the memory array is split into two parts,
similar to the work by Vatajelu et al. [21]. One part gener-
ates a reference current, the other part produces responses
according to the comparison between the current read out
from the active cells and the reference current. The differ-
ence from [21] is that the active cells are checked first to
determine its state (AP or P). If it is in AP state, then a
reference current corresponding to AP state is generated from
reference cells, otherwise, a reference current corresponding
to P state is generated. Accordingly, both AP and P states
are exploited to generate responses according to the current
state of the eNVM without disturbing its state. A buffer and
a write back circuit are not involved during the generation of
responses in BF-MPUF. Such a BF-MPUF design is resistant
to possible leakage or side-channel attacks. The authors also
investigated a method to optimize the design parameters to
maximally balance both the memory yield and PUF qualities,
eg. uniqueness.
Overall, the BF-MPUF design methodology is demon-
strated by employing STT-MRAM, nevertheless other
eNVMs such as PCM and RRAM are also applicable for this
BF-MPUF design methodology. The core concept employed
by BF-MPUF is that a logic bit is stored as a resistance in
these eNVMs instead of charge preserved in CMOS devices.
STT-MRAM-Based PUF 5: Zhang et al. proposed a
STT-MRAM PUF that brings together high reliability, recon-
figurability and multiple bits per cell capability [24]. This
PUF structure is also memory based. The memory cell con-
sists of 2 transistors acting as selectors and 2 MTJs, similar
to the memory cell used in STT-MRAM-based PUF 3 [22].
The high reliability is ensured by the Automatic Write Back
scheme that is similar to that proposed in [22] (see the
STT-MRAM-based PUF 3 in this section). The multi-
ple bits per cell is achieved by exploiting bit alteration
phenomena [24]. For example, comparison of resistances of
STT-MRAM in the P or AP state may not be consistent.
Specifically, the resistance of the first MTJ in a 2T2MTJ cell
is higher than the second MTJ when both of them are set to
the P state resulting in a response of logic ‘1’. However, the
resistance of the first MTJ may be lower than the secondMTJ
when both of them are set to AP state giving rise to a response
of logic ‘0’. Hence, altering the initial state to a different state
allows the responses to be reconfigured.
The work in [24] has advantages in terms of chip area
and energy consumption in comparison with conventional
memory based PUFs. Nevertheless, the simulation results
show that the portion of cells displaying the bit alteration
phenomena out of all memory cells is only 11.4%. Thismeans
that 88.6% of the memory cells are not capable of generating
different response bits when the twoMTJs are set to P and AP
states, respectively, due to strong self-correlation effects. For
example, if the resistance of the first MTJ is larger than the
resistance of the second MTJ in P state in the same 2T2MTJ
cell due to the difference in their junction areas, the resistance
of the first MTJ will still be larger than the resistance of the
second MTJ in AP state. This is because the influence of
junction areas on MTJ resistances in the P and AP states are
similar.
E. MEMRISTOR-BASED PUFS
We briefly introduce a nanocrossbar array and memristor
by virtue of some memristor based PUF designs utilizing
nanocrossbars. The nanocrossbar is in principle the simplest
functional electrical circuit holding great promise in nano-
electronics due to its attractive, regular structure, relatively
low cost and simple implementation. A nanocrossbar array
(Fig. 9a) consists of parallel horizontal wires on the top and
perpendicular vertical wires at the bottom. Nanocrossbars
are usually constructed with a passive two-terminal resis-
tive device, such as a memristor [14], [83], [84] shown
in Fig. 9b, at the cross-point for data storage, computing,
and neuromorphic applications. Together with nanocrossbar
structures, properties of memristors such as non-volatility,
switching behavior and nanoscale dimensions present new
opportunities for realizing ultra high density memory arrays.
In [14], the simple memristor model (often referred to
as the HP2 model) treats a memristor as an ideal device,
whose resistance is finely tuned according to the integral
of amplitude and period of the pulse applied across it. This
simple model is the basis for several memristor based PUF
designs when simulations are carried out to evaluate their per-
formance [25], [26], [32], [85]. Given the range of memristor-
based PUFs exhibiting characteristics of various PUF types
described in Section II, we categorize and describe them
below as: i) weak PUFs; ii) public PUFs; iii) reconfigurable
PUFs; and iv) strong PUFs.
1) WEAK PUFS
Weak-Write-Based PUFs: Two memristor based
PUFs [25], [26] employ a time and voltage constrained write
mechanism (weak-write) to force each memristor to a the-
oretically undefined logic region (neither logic ‘1’ nor ‘0’).
2Hewlett-Packard labs or HP lab.
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FIGURE 9. Nanocrossbar array and a memristor. (a) Nanocrossbar array
of memristors, where each memristor is located at the crosspoint of a top
and a bottom electrode. When reading a targeted memristor (selected cell
in the top-right corner), reading voltage is applied to the selected word
line and the current passing through the selected bit line is sensed to
determine the state of the memristor. For other unselected word and bit
lines, they can be connected to ground or to a high impedance (floating).
During reading it is important to note that there also exists many sneak
path currents besides the desired read current. (b) Illustrates the
operation principles of a memristor. There is a concentration gradient of
filaments that can be moved back and forth using an applied electric
field. The memristor switches from a HRS (High Resistance State) to a LRS
(Low Resistance State) with a positive potential difference between the
bottom electrode and top electrode corresponding to SET switching as
one or more conductive filaments grows or forms, while it switches from
LRS to HRS with a negative potential difference between the bottom
electrode and top electrode corresponding to RESET switching as the
filaments are disrupted. Once a memristor has been programmed, its
memristance does not change even if its power supply is disconnected
unless a voltage higher than a threshold voltage is applied across the
device. Note that this is a very simple illustration of the memristor and
does not cover all device-physics aspects of switching. After [34].
Subsequently, these memristors attain an unpredictable logic
state (either logic ‘1’ or ‘0’) owing to process variations that
influence memristance. Then the resistance can be read out
by sensing the current passing through the memristor. This is
achieved by applying a small read voltage across the memris-
tor. Notably, the read signal—has a negative pulse followed
by a positive pulse with equal magnitude and duration—
must be carefully generated requiring highly accurate signal
generators. Although [26] utilizes a nanocrossbar array to
increase the information density, similar to a SRAM PUF,
a memristor PUF [25], [26] is only capable of producing a
limited number of CRPs,
More significantly, the PUFs in [25] and [26] require a
calibration procedure to determine the weak-write parameters
(time and voltage) to force memristors into the undefined
logic region. Furthermore, the work in [26] does not con-
sider sneak path currents [86] within the nanocrossbar array
that make the readout of the PUF responses (i.e resistance
through sensing current) very difficult. Koeber et al. [26]
only evaluated PUF performance in terms of uniqueness from
simulations, while Rose et al. [25] performed evaluations on
randomness, uniqueness and bit-biasing also through simula-
tions. Reliability are not evaluated in both of these studies.
Mazady et al. [79] recently carried out a prototype demon-
stration of the weak-write time based PUF proposed by
Rose et al. [25]. They fabricated six memristors and imple-
mented other necessary peripheral CMOS circuits with fab-
ricated memristors on a breadboard to conduct the first
memristor based PUF demo. The results show 50% ran-
domness for responses generated from these six memris-
tors individually—ideally, population of memristors used for
evaluation is expected to be larger. However, detailed results
of response consistency from the same memristor under mul-
tiple reprogramming cycles when taking C2C (cycle to cycle)
variations into consideration and evaluation of reliability is
needed in the future to better understand the performance of
weak-write based PUFs.
Highly Reliable PUF:Che et al. [29] proposed amemristor
based PUF that is capable of regenerating responses reliably
without helper data or ECC (Error Correction Code). This
work in essence is similar to the work of Zhang et al. [22],
although a different methodology and device are used. The
extraction of the PUF signature in this memristor-based PUF
follows several steps:
FIGURE 10. Experimental resistance variation distribution extracted from
a 40× 40 nanocrossbar array with 1600 memristors obtained from
experimental data in [83].
a) All of the memristors in the nanocrossbar array are
initially programmed into LRS (Low Resistance State).
Where abundant resistance variations in LRS, see
Fig. 10, are exploited as the source of uncontrollable
variations of the PUF.
b) A voltage-to-digital converter (VDC) is employed to
digitize the analog resistance of each cell to a value
between 0 and 127.
c) Themedian of these digital values is obtained by count-
ing the number of instances for each digitized value
(from 0 to 127).
d) Eachmemristor cell in the nanocrossbar is programmed
into LRS if the digital value of itself is lower than
the median value, otherwise the memristor cell is pro-
grammed into HRS.
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FIGURE 11. Time-bounded authentication protocol using nano PPUF. After [28].
To regenerate PUF responses, the state of memristors
are read out for given challenges that are actually selected
addresses. Since the ratio of HRS to LRS is large enough
to distinguish these two states, see Fig. 10, even taking the
right tail of the LRS resistance distribution and the left tail
of the HRS resistance distribution into consideration, we can
see a large gap between HRS and LRS. Therefore, the reliable
response regeneration is ensured.
In summary, the high reliability as illustrated
in [22] and [29], firstly, exploits the resistance variations as
shown in Fig 10, in either LRS or HRS to extract a one-time
response. Notably, this response extraction is only carried out
once. Secondly, memristors (STT-MRAMs) are programmed
to the LRS or HRS according to the extracted one-time
response value. For example, the memristor is programmed
to be HRS if the one-time extracted response is ‘1’, or vice
versa [29]. This step exploits the large HRS/LRS ratio—large
resistance gap between HRS and LRS shown in Fig 10—to
ensure that the readout of the write-back response extracted
first time is always robust. However, writing the extracted
PUF response to a memristor (STT-MRAM) is similar to
storing secret keys in NVM, which can make the secret
keys vulnerable to physical attacks, although the one-time
extracted responses—keys—are inherently unique from one
device to another.
2) PUBLIC PUF
A novel nano public PUF (PPUF) based on a memristor
nanocrossbar was first proposed in [28] built upon their pre-
vious work [87] and further improved in [88]. The PPUF
is suitable for authentication and public-key communication.
They exploited several unique characteristics of memristors
such as:
a) Bidirectionality to allow the input signal be applied at
any end of the circuit.
b) Nonlinearity of the memrsitor device model.
c) The fabrication process variations inherent in memris-
tors.
Note the nano PPUF designed in [87] and [88] is demon-
strated by using memristors [28]. However, the nano
PPUF can also be implemented through other types of
nanoelectronic devices such as PCM or STT-MRAM, if these
devices are properly designed.
The time-bounded authentication protocol of nano PPUF
can be described as follows—also illustrated in Fig. 11:
a) Whenever verifier (Alice) wants to authenticate the
prover (Bob), the verifier (Alice) obtains the model of
the nano PPUF from a trusted third party.
b) The verifier (Alice) randomly picks up a challenge
(Vin1,Vin2, etc.) and sends it to the prover (Bob).
c) The prover (Bob) measures the responses (Vout1,Vout2,
etc.) for the given challenge, and sends the responses
(Vout1,Vout2, etc.) to the verifier (Alice).
d) The verifier (Alice) selects a subsection of the nano
PPUF, for example the polyomino in the bottom-right
corner of the nanocrossbar shown in step 4© in Fig. 11.
Then the verifier (Alice) requests boundary voltages of
the selected subsection (eg., VC ,VD,VE ,VF shown as
red points) from the prover (Bob).
e) The prover (Bob) measures the boundary voltage and
sends them to the verifier.
f) The verifier (Alice) simulates the selected subsection
for the given challenge based on boundary voltages
(eg., VC ,VD,VE ,VF ) and determines the correspond-
ing responses, say Vout1 and Vout2. If the simulated
responses match the responses from the prover (Bob),
then the verifier authenticates the prover.
During the authentication, the bounded time for allowing
the prover to measure the responses and boundary voltages
should be less than T0, which makes stimulation of the corre-
sponding responses and boundary voltages by the adversary
impossible. In particular, the boundary voltages help to sig-
nificantly reduce the computing time for the verifier (Alice) to
simulate the response. However, an adversary cannot provide
correct boundary voltages within the bounded time T0 by
using the model of the PPUF. So the time T0 must be pre-
defined. Notably, in the last step, the simulation time of the
selected subsection costs much less time than the time to
simulate the entire nano PPUF.
A nano PPUF always needs very accurate measurements
of its physical model parameters to create a model of the
nano PPUF, which is inconvenient and expensive. In addition,
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the high reliability requirement of PPUF designs may pose a
significant challenge for their realization in practice.
3) RECONFIGURABLE PUFS
Gao et al. [34] and Chen [30], [31] noticed that memristors
have unique cycle to cycle (C2C) variations introduced by
each programming operation. This phenomenon is caused by
the random change of locations of some filaments during
disruption and formation [31]. Hence, the resistance observed
in HRS state or LRS state varies from cycle to cycle as
illustrated in Fig. 12. This unique variation is desirable for
creating a reconfigurable PUF, whose CRPs are refreshable
by simply reprogramming the memristor from HRS to LRS
or from LRS to HRS. The update of rPUF based on C2C
variations is cost-effective, requires no additional circuitry
and is endowed with an unlimited reconfiguration space—the
number of times that rPUF can be transformed into a newPUF
instance—as opposed to other rPUFs. More significantly,
the reconfiguration is nearly impossible to reverse due
to the random behavior of the disruptions and formations of
the filaments.
FIGURE 12. Cycle to cycle (C2C) variations. ROFF /HRS and RON /LRS
variation of an individual memristor for 500 cycles, experimental
data is adopted from [89].
4) STRONG PUFS
The aforementioned memrirstor based PUF designs only pro-
duces a limited number of CRPs, except the nano PPUF.
Gao et al. [34]—based on their previous work in [33] to
design mrPUF, Rose and Meade [27], and Mathew et al. [32]
proposed three different memristor based strong PUF designs
that are capable of generating a very large number of CRPs.
Analyses on resistance to model building attacks are provided
in [34] and [32].
XBARPUF: The XBARPUF was proposed by
Rose and Meade [27] to circumvent weaknesses—limited
number of CRPs and calibration procedure—of their pre-
vious design in [25] (see Weak-Write-Based PUFs) based
on a similar write-time mechanism. In this work [27],
a nanocrossbar is utilized to improve the information density.
A simplified architecture without the circuits for generating
control signals, eg. R/W and RST are illustrated in Fig. 13.
The switch box behaves like a single stage in an APUF.
Whenever a challenge bit, eg. C0, is applied to a switch box,
two memristors—eg. M0,0 and M1,0—located in two rows,
first and second rows, are selected and a write voltage is
applied through R/W . One memristor, eg. M0,0, is actively
written to either HRS or LRS, while the other one, M1,0, is
inactive (retains its resistance). To generate a response bit, for
example R0, during write, currents from both columns—eg.
first column and second column—are compared. Depending
on the fastest column to reach a threshold current level, the
arbiter produces either ‘1’ or ‘0’. The currents are determined
by the resistances of memristors connected to that column.
The XBARPUF eliminates the calibration procedure to
find optimized default weak-write parameters by resort-
ing to the relative write-times of pairs of memristor cir-
cuits to generate the response. Also, it can generate M -bit
responses simultaneously by exploiting the ultra high density
of nanocrossbars. Although this PUF is able to generate
2N CRPs, its model is similar to the model of the APUF.
Therefore, it appears to be vulnerable to modeling attacks.
The reliability of XBARPUF is not evaluated as the simple
model (McDonald model [90]) that is used in simulations to
verify their design lacks temperature dependent parameters.
Memristor PUF: In the study by Mathew et al. [32], the
PUF structure proposed is illustrated in Fig. 14 and is similar
to a typical APUF. However, the model of this PUF is differ-
ent from the model of an APUF. The operation of the PUF
follows:
a) Reset: This operation resets all the serially connected
memristors to random states. The control voltages are
VRST and VRST.
b) Challenge Application: The challenge enable voltage,
VCE, enables the challenges when the Vpulse is applied.
Duration of VCE is shorter than Vpulse. When VCE
is enabled, the challenge applied determines how far
the Vpulse can propagate. Specifically, Vpulse can only
reach the first memristor segment with an applied
challenge bit of ‘1’. Furthermore, Vpulse changes the
resistance of memristors along the propagation paths,
which ultimately determines the time delay of these two
paths. The authors refer to this approach as challenge-
dependent stage delays.
c) Signal Propagation: Once the VCE is disabled, the
Vpulse propagates to the end of the delay chain. Dis-
abling VCE turns all transistors along the two paths
into cut-off state. Hence these transistors exhibit drain
capacitances. Then the time delay can be modeled
through the delay of RC networks [32].
d) Response Generation: The wining pulse from the race
between two paths determines the response as done in
the APUF.
The stage-delay parameters of this PUF are challenge-
dependent, which is different from a traditional APUF. From
the pespective of machine learning, the nonlinearity result-
ing from challenge-dependent properties makes common
machine learning techniques—eg. support vector machine
and logistic regression—hard to apply. Mathew el al. [32] not
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FIGURE 13. Simplified architecture of the XBARPUF for N configuration and M-bit response [27].
FIGURE 14. Architecture of the proposed memristor-based PUF circuit [32].
only evaluate the performance of this proposed memristor-
based PUFs, but also provide results from machine learning
based modeling attacks using known attack methodologies
against PUFs. Their works show good performance, espe-
cially, with regard to reliability and resistance to modeling
attacks.
However, the PUF response generation takes several steps
that seem to complicate its operation. The precise control of
voltage and their sequence may cause difficulties in practical
applications. The response generation is based on time delay
difference between two paths, which is similar to the response
generation of the APUF. Therefore, when the delay difference
are too small to be resolved by the arbiter, we expect the
arbiter to transition into metastable state as demonstrated in
APUFs [91]. Furthermore, the temperature dependent coef-
ficient of the employed memristor model (HP model) is
not described. Hence, the superior reliability obtained based
on simulation is speculative. Moreover, the ideal memristor
model used to validate the results does not take C2C varia-
tions into account, which may further aggravate the reliability
of the PUF.
The maximum number of CRPs used for training a model
in [32] is 3500, which appear to be inadequate based on
published modeling attack tests on PUFs [51]. Therefore,
more work is needed to confirm the illustrated modeling
attack resistance. We note that symmetrical challenge vectors
should be avoid for this PUF structure as they can lead to
deterministic responses for other challenges. For example, if
C1 = {01......10} gives response of ‘1’, a different challenge
C2 = {01xxxxxx10} will always produce response of ‘1’
irrespective of the challenge bit pattern in xxxxxx.
mrSPUF: This PUF structure (mrSPUF) proposed by
Gao et al. [34] is illustrated in Fig. 15. The mrSPUF design
circumvents the limited number of CRPs generated in their
previous work for mrPUF [33]. The resistance variation is
more prevalent in the LRS state than in the HRS state due
to the thickness of memristors demonstrated in [92]. Further-
more, in [93] it is demonstrated that resistance is resilient
to temperature and telegraph noise in the LRS state more
than in the HRS state. Therefore, all memristors are pro-
grammed into LRS state initially. The mrSPUF architecture
combines nanocrossbar and current mirror controlled ring
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FIGURE 15. mrSPUF architecture. (a) Simplified mrSPUF architecture. All the memristors are in the ON state. The shaded programming
control circuit comprises the row programming control circuitry in (b) and column programming control circuitry in (c), which is
employed to program memristors in the nanocrossbar array before it acts as a PUF and facilitates reconfigurability of mrSPUF by
subsequent reprogramming to refresh CRPs of mrSPUF to transform it into a new PUF instance. In contrast to the programing control
circuit, the top decoder block and left analog multiplexers block, CM-ROs and counters enables the stimulation by an challenge and
the extraction of a corresponding response. A challenge encoded as a vector of binary values (bits) is used to provide the address bits
for both the analog multiplexers block and the decoder block. (d) CM-RO. Each current mirror starves only an inverter in the RO
structure, where the bias memristor for each current mirror, Mi , is selected from the nanocrossbar array. Although variation in the
oscillation frequency of each CM-RO is slightly influenced by the threshold voltage variation in the CMOS transistor composing the
starved inverter and current mirror structures, the overall variation in the oscillation frequency is primarily determined by the
variations in memresistance of Mi if the supply voltage, VDD, is kept constant.
oscillators (CM-ROs) to realize not only a strong PUF but
also a reconfigurable PUF, here the variations exploited is
sourced not only frommanufacturing variations but also C2C
variations introduced from reprogramming operations. The
response generation is based on comparison of a pair of
frequencies of two CM-ROs, where the frequency of each
ring oscillator is configured by i (i = 5 in this example
implementation case) memristors selected by a challenge.
The detailed configuration is shown in Fig. 15(d), where
each memristor starves one inverter in a CM-RO through a
current mirror based on the current passing through it. This
means the delay of the given inverter is predominantly deter-
mined by the resistance of the memristor that configures this
inverter.
In general, mrSPUF has two CM-ROs, each CM-RO has i
inverters, therefore 2 × i memristors are randomly selected.
So the total CRPs (NTCRP) in this configuration can be esti-
mated as:
NTCRP = N ×
(M
i
)× (M−ii )
2
, (1)
where N is the number of columns, M is the number of
rows. Therefore, the number of inverters in CM-RO or the
nanocrossbar array size or all of the design parameters can be
altered according to the desired number of CRPs.
The average frequency observed by using five inverters
configured by five memristors is in the vicinity of 25 MHz.
Therefore, an advantage of using the current starved ring
oscillator is that the frequency is sufficiently low that an
accurate counter is not required to measure the frequency
of CM-RO. The advantages of using CM-ROs in mrSPUF are
summarized below:
a) The current starved ring oscillator slows down the fre-
quency of the RO, as a result, facilitates the design of
a simple counter, because measuring high frequency
requires a more accurate counter, higher power con-
sumption and takes up more silicon area accordingly.
b) The CM-RO is used to translate the analog variations in
memresistance into digital values. The use of CM-ROs
to generate responses avoids potential metastability
issues occurred in APUFs.
c) Different memristors are selected to configure each
inverter in this RO loop to significantly increase the
number of CRPs.
d) Two CM-ROs are used to construct a differential cir-
cuit. This design will mitigate some fluctuations caused
by noise, such as thermal noise, to improve the relia-
bility of the mrSPUF, since the response is generated
from the comparison of a pair of frequencies of two
CM-ROs.
To enable the mrSPUF to act as a rPUF, additional cir-
cuitry is not necessary. Reconfiguration can be achieved in
two simple sequential operations on memristors: RESET,
and then SET. Specifically, memristors are firstly switched
from the LRS state to the HRS state by applying
R = |VRESET|, a voltage that is higher than the absolute
value of the negative threshold voltage, to the selected column
(bit line) and applying S = 0 to the selected row (word line),
see Fig. 15 (b) and (c). Then they are switched back from
the HRS state to the LRS state by applying S = VSET to
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TABLE 2. Performance comparison of surveyed emerging PUFs with nanotechnology.
the selected row and R = 0 to the selected column using the
programming control circuitry shown in Fig. 15.
IV. DISCUSSION
Considering different architectures, application scenarios and
security features of the surveyed PUFs, a direct comparison
would be difficult, instead we provide typical performance
metrics for comparison as shown in Table 2. These met-
rics include randomness, uniqueness and BER—this is the
complementary metric to reliability. In addition, we provide
an order of magnitude description of the number of CRPs
generated by a PUF in relationship to its basic building
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blocks—detailed definitions are in the table notes2 of Table 2.
Moreover, we classify the surveyed PUFs into different PUF
classes including weak PUF, strong PUF, rPUF, and PPUF.
Further we discuss the opportunities and challenges facing
these emerging PUFs with nanotechnology.
A. OPPORTUNITIES
Based on the surveyed PUF architectures, we summarize the
opportunities for PUF designs based on emerging nanoelec-
tronic devices.
a) Small Footprint:As the fabrication process scales down
to nano dimensions, the uncontrollable process vari-
ations become more prevalent, which is desirable for
PUF designs. The footprint of these nanodevices is
smaller, leading to higher density information that can
be integrated in a smaller integrated circuit. For exam-
ple, SHIC PUF takes advantage of such a high density
property offered by nanocrossbar arrays. The small
footprint is desirable for securing resource constrained
computing platforms such as RFID tags when taking
lower area overhead into consideration.
b) Low Cost Fabrication: The fabrication of a majority
of these nanoscale devices is compatible with current
CMOS fabrication processes. In addition, the fabrica-
tion complexity is low. Furthermore, their fabrication
cost is expected to be lower in the long term when these
devices become mainstream.
c) C2C Variations: The unique C2C variations observed
in the case of memristors can be exploited to construct
rPUFs without any extra circuitry overhead offering
refreshable CRPs that still retain a PUF instance’s orig-
inal security properties. In addition, the reconfiguration
operation is impossible to be reversed by all parties,
which is one of the key requirements in the design
of a secure rPUF. As for rPUFs built upon the C2C
variations shown in [31] and [34], future works need
to investigate the dominance of C2C variations with
respect to process variations to better understand the
security properties of reconfigurable PUFs.
d) Programming Sensitivity: In contrast to memristor-
based rPUFs relying on C2C programming variations,
the MLB capability and the programming sensitivity
create opportunities to build rPUFs, eg. [19], [22], [75],
based on PCM and STT-MRAM.
e) Nonvolatility: Nonvolatility can be employed to reli-
ably regenerate PUF responses such as in [22], [24],
and [29].. In addition, it can double memory as a key
generator without additional buffer storage and other
affiliated circuitry that is more cost-effective in com-
parison with conventional memory based PUFs such as
SRAM PUF [23].
f) Bidirectionality: The nanodevices aforementioned in
this paper are all two terminal devices. Hence they are
bidirectional unlike PMOS/NMOS devices where input
and output cannot be reversed and therefore facilitates
the design of novel nano PPUFs [28], [87], [88].
g) Formation Process: The formation process of memris-
tors is a one-time irreversible process. Therefore, the
formation process [94] before they can be programmed
normally between HRS and LRS can eliminate secu-
rity issues caused by untrusted manufacturers: a man-
ufacturer that measure CRPs without authority. If the
formation process is only authorized to be carried out
by a trusted party, then only a trusted party is able to
safely collect CRPs. If the manufacturer attempts to
collect CRPs, it will be discovered by the trusted party.
Hence, formation is a benefit to PUF security in terms
of tamper detection.
h) Security: Further, the PUF structures based on emerg-
ing nanoelectronic devices may circumvent some secu-
rity issues challenging current silicon based PUFs. For
example, the SRAM PUF has been broken in a non-
invasive way through a fault injection attack based on
remanence decay in volatile memory [95], and semi-
invasive and fully invasive attack methods [96], [97].
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that APUF and
its variants can be physically characterized by means of
photonic emission analysis in CMOS [98].
B. CHALLENGES
Since these nanoelectronic devices are emerging devices,
technologies themselves have challenging issues to over-
come, and so do PUF designs based on these
devices.
a) Experimental Validation: A majority of the pro-
posed PUF structures are not experimentally vali-
dated. There are studies that show limited experimental
results [16], [34], [75]. However, the experimental
results only evaluate part of the PUF architecture. For
example, the nanodevice characteristics such as resis-
tance variation are based on experiments, whereas an
efficient peripheral circuit to extract secret information
are only proposed but not experimentally implemented
to validate the entire PUF design.
b) PUF Performance Evaluation: Statistical analysis
on trade-offs among uniqueness, randomness, BER,
resilience to model building attacks and side-channel
attacks, and overhead costs are expected to be taken
into consideration for a more comprehensive evalua-
tion of PUF performance. Performance evaluations of
some memristor-based PUF designs are based on sim-
ple device behavioral models [86] instead of physical
compact models [99] without carefully taking other
inherent characteristics of nanodevices into consider-
ation. For example, C2C variations, which can poten-
tially cause reliability issues when regenerating PUF
responses are not investigated in [25], [26], and [32].
These studies assume a memristor to return to its
original resistance value when the same programming
parameters, eg. duration or amplitude of programming
pulse, are employed to reprogram it.
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c) Standard Models: There are no industry standard mod-
els for these emerging nanodevices. Therefore, results
obtained through simulations may be speculative with-
out experimental implementation and validation. So
collaboration between hardware security designers and
device engineers are essential to advance these PUF
designs and finally push forward these designs from
laboratory work to practical applications.
d) Reliability: For memristor-based PPUFs, reliability
issue is crucial because the response produced from a
physical PPUF device and that from a simulator may
be vastly different due to the poor reliability of the
PPUF device. Unlike conventional PUF types, normal
reliability enhancement techniques such as ECC are
not directly applicable to PPUF (or may require an
extremely high redundancy for an acceptable error cor-
rection capability) owing to the complexity of PPUF
design. Similarly, specific problems may also exist for
other nano technology based PUFs where repeated pro-
graming of nanodevices may aggravate the reliability
of PUFs, especially those requiring RESET operations
(eg. [20], [32]), due to specific writing endurance capa-
bility of nanodevices—the number of switching cycles
that nanodevices can reversibly and reliably perform. In
addition, the lack of temperature dependent memristor
device models, as highlighted in [27], makes some
reliability results speculative—eg. [32], where the tem-
perature dependent coefficient is not described.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we survey recent emerging PUF designs with
nanotechnology. These PUF designs provide a number of
unique properties such as abundance of process variations,
bidirectionality, C2C variations and formation process to
realize different PUF designs and architectures. We high-
lighted a number of opportunities offered by these nanode-
vices that can potentially be exploited by PUF designers.
In addition, we have discussed major limitations of cur-
rently proposed PUF designs that are based on emerg-
ing nanoelelctronics. These limitations are expected to be
addressed through the combined effort between PUF design-
ers and device engineers. Continued progress in emerging
PUF designs with nanotechnology will secure future memory
and circuit applications with low energy and area overhead,
while taking advantage of unique device level properties
offered by nanodevices.
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